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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
cial expression of this view is that of Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil
Co.° Nevertheless, a number of courts have held that the public policy of
each state is found, in its constitution, statutes and case law7 and any sub-
stantial difference between those of the forum and those of the state where
a transaction occurred justifies a refusal to entertain an action predicated upon
the application of sister-state law. s
In numerous cases the right of the courts of the forum to decide a conflicts
of law problem according to its local public policy has been tacitly assumed,
without regard to constitutional provisions. 9  The "full faith and credit"
clause of the federal constitution abolished in large measure the principle of
international law by which local policy may dominate rules of comity as
among the states of the Union.' 0 Many rights acquired under the laws of
another state are now protected by the "full faith and credit" clause,11 the
"equal privileges and immunities" clause 12 and the "due process" clausell
of the United States Constitution.
The instant case seems to represent a strict application of the public policy
concept. Even though advance payments for personal services to avoid gar-
nishment are illegal in the forum, this type of arrangement has been held
valid in a number of other courts as not being contrary to the good morals
of the public.14 It is felt that such a literal application of this concept of
public policy, when constitutional restrictions are considered, will severely
curtail the enforcement of sister-state law on a reciprocal basis.
RODNEY S. WEBB.
EMINENT DOiAIN - JUST COMIPENSATION - COST OF MOVING PERSONAL
PROPERTY. - The Circuit Court awarded defendant full compensation for con-
demnation of his land which included reasonable cost of moving personal
property, where such condemnation of defencant's property necessitated vaca-
27 Yale L. J. 656, 663-64 (1918). But see Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political
Crisis in the Conflict of Laws, 49 Yale L. J. 1027, 1052-55 (1940).
t 6. 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 201-02 (1918). "We are not so provincial as
to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at
home . . . [T]he. courts . . .. do not close their doors unless help would violate some
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal."
7. See Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 111. 551, 55 N.E. 577 (1899), writ of
error dismissed, 187 U.S. 651 (1902); Continental Supply Co. v. Syndicate Trust Co., 52
N.D. 209, 202 N.W. 404 (1924); International Harvester Co. v. McAdam, 142 Wis. 114,
124 N.W. 1042 (1910).
8. E.g., Farmers & Merchants Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 216 Iowa 988, 250 N.W. 214
(1933); Davis v. Ruzicka, 170 Md. 112, 183 Atl.,569, cert. denied, 298 U.S. 671 (1936);
Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935).
9. E.g., cf. Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Adams Exp. Co., 56 I1. 66. 99 N.E. 893 (1912);
Hanson v. Great Northern By. Co., 18 N.D. 324, 121 N.W. 78 (1909).
10. Broderick .v. Rosner, 294. U.S. 629 (1935); cf. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609
(1951) (wrongful death action). The courts of the District of Columbia and the states
are equally hound by the commands of the full faith and credit clause. See Suydam v.
Ameli, 46 A.2d 763 (D.C. Mun. App. 1946).
11. See Broderick v. Rosner, supra note 10; Smithsonian Institute v. St. John, 214
U.S. 19 (1909); Cole v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 I1. 415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933); Roller v.
Murray, 71 W. Va. 161, 76 S.E. 172 (1912) writ of error dismissed, 234 U.S. 738
(1914).
12. See Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); cf. Missouri ex rel Southern By. Co.
v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
13. See Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & P. Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934).
14. E.g., Hall v. Armour Packing Co., 102 Ga. 586, 29 S.E. 139 (1897); Campagna
v. Automatic Electric Co., 293 fI1. App. 437, 12 N.E.2d 695 (1938); Bump v. Augustine,
154 N.W. 782 (Iowa 1915).
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tion of entire property and equipment and supplies had to be moved to a new
location. On appeal the Supreme Court of Florida held, one justice dissenting,
that the judgment be afflrmed. Jacksonville Express. Auth. v. Henry G. Du
Pree Co., 108 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1959).
When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is entitled under
the Federal Constitution to just compensation,' which is held to be the market
value of the property only 2 and not the cost of moving personal property or
other consequential losses.' Such a consequental loss, is a damage to, or de-
struction: of, property not actually taken,4 but which results indirectly from
a lawful act of taking. 5 This general rule is applicable when the entire
interest in the leasehold is condemnedo or when the fee simple is taken in
federal condemnation proceedings.7 When only part of the leasehold period
is condemned, with no option to take the remainder, the courts make an
exception to the general rule and allow the lessee reasonable costs of re-
moval of his property and its subsequent return to the premises.8 Although
the weight of authority in federal condemnations excludes payments for con-
sequential losses, the Supreme Court has recognized the harshness of its in-
terpretation of the fifth amendment in certain instances and has allowed re-
covery for such losses.9 These decisions are a step in the right direction, al-
though they have been limited to temporary takings. 1°
Many state jurisdictions follow the federal rule that "just compensation"
does not include cost of moving personal property and disallow the consid-
eration of such cost as a separate item;11 however, some states have allowed
moving costs on the theory that it constituted an element of market value or
damage to the property condemned."2 Other states allow them on the basis
1. U.S. Const. amend. V.
2. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246 (1934); New York v. Sage, 239 U.S. 57 (1915); Monongahela Navigation
Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) (the Court said that just compensation was
payment for the property and not payment to the owner. It also argued that every other
clause of the fifth amendment was personal except the eminent domain provision and
that therefore the constitution only requires payment for property taken and nothing more).
3. United States v. Westinghouse, 339 U.S. 261 (1950); Bothwell v. United States,
254 U.S. 231 (1920).
4. See Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 US. 146 (1924).
5. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
6. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
7. Joslin Co. v. Providence,.262 U.S. 668 (1923); Bothwell v. United States, 254
U.S. 231 (1920).
8. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (the concurring
opinion states' that this is also an analogous argument for allowing removal costs where
the entire fee is taken,. since the -owner would never have to move out but for the con-
demnation).
9. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945); accord, Kimball v.
United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
10. Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67
Yale L.J. 61 (1957-58) presents an excellent discussion on the merits of allowing re-
covery of consequential losses and the dubious logic-the presence of a willing buyer and
a voluntary seller, that the losses are. too speculative, and that these losses are inherent
in any sale-on which the Court formulated its present rule. See also 36 Ore. L. Rev.
180 (1956-57) which supports the.pioposition that a distinction must be made between
the condemnation of land held in fee and that which is held under lease because a lessee
will eventually move upon expiration of the lease. He therefore suffers no additional ex-
pense of moving personal property, whereas the same is not true of an owner in fee.
11. United States v. Building Known as 651 'Brannan Street, 55 F. Supp. 667 (N.D.
Cal. 1944); In re Slum Clearance In Cit of Detroit, 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W.2d 195
(1952); In re Widening, 3rd St. inw-St. Paul, 223 N:W. '458 (Minn. 1929).
12. E.g., Harvey Textilev.. Hill, 135 -Conn-:1686, 67 A.2d 851 (1949); Metropolitan
West Side HR. v. Siegel, 161 Ill. 638, 44 N.E. 276 (1896); 'In re Widening of Gratiot
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of constitutional provisions which differ from those of the United States Con-
stitution.1
3
The North Dakota Constitution 1 4 provides that private property shall not be
"taken or damaged" for public use without just compensation, and this has
been held to be broader than the guarantee of the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution.15 Just compensation should then include not only
the value of the property condemned but also consequential losses attributable
thereto so that the owner would be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he
would have been had the property not been taken. 16
In the dissenting opinion of the instant case, moving costs are considered
consequential damnages.'; A North Dakota statutel ; has been interpreted to
provide for consequential losses arising from injuries to other property in
condennation proceedings. 1 9 Also, under the North Dakota constitutional
provision which requires payment of compensation when property is damaged,
consequential losses may be recovered. 2
0
Therefore, it would appear that with the authority from the interpretation
of the constitution and statutes by the North Dakota courts, there should be
no difficulty in disregarding the much criticized general rule and allowing
moving costs as an element of fair market value. This would follow the spirit
of the constitutional requirements for the payment of "just compensation."
G. EUGENE ISAAK.
LABOR RELATIONS - LABOR RELATION ACTS - PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT -
RIGHT OF POLICE OFFICERS TO UNIONIZE. - Officers of the Little Rock Po-
licemen's Union brought suit to enjoin the city officials from enforcing an act
requiring that persons be denied employment because of membership in a
labor union,' contending the act was unconstitutional due to Ark. Const.
Avenue, 294 Mich. 569, 293 N.W. 755 (1940); General Ice Cream Co. v. State, 99
N.Y.S.2d 312 (Ct.Cl. 1950).
13. Ill. Const. art. II, § 13, and Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 47, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1950) provide
that "private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just com-
pensation .... .. " See Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888).
14. N.D. Const. art. I, § 14; see also, N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1501 (1943). In
cases where state constitutions provide that compensation must be paid for property "taken
or damaged," consequential damages may be recovered, 2 Nichols, Eminent Domain §
6.4432 (2) (1950).
15. Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808 (1942).
16. See Walker v. United States, 64 F. Supp. 135 (Ct.C1. 1946); Martin v. Tyler, 4
N.D. 278, 60 N.W. 392 (1894); Donaldson v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 592, 3 N.W.2d 808
(1942). N.D. Rev. Code § 32-1532 (Supp. 1957) allows, at the discretion of the
court, attorney's fees to the defendant condemnee, the general rule being that attorney's
fees are not allowed under condemnation statutes unless specifically provided for.
17. See United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946).
18. See N.D. Rev. Code 32-1522 (3) (1943).
19. See Little v. Burleigh County, 82 N.W.2d 603 (N.D. 1957).
20. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. Von Bank, 72 N.D. 497, 8 N.W.2d 599 (1943);
Hamilton v. Bismarck, 71 N.D. 321, 300 N.W. 631 (1941); King v. Stark County, 67
N.D. 260, 271 N.W. 771 (1937) (North Dakota allows recovery when a person has sus-
tained direct, physical damages to his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally).
1. Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947), Act 30 (1957) § 19-1715. Union membership by police
officers is inconsistent with the discipline which their employment requires and § 19-1716
of the same act provides that no person who is a member of a policemen's union shall be
eligible to serve on any municipal police force and that the union members currently serving
shall be dismissed unless they sever their relationship with the union within thirty days.
[VOL. 35
